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Accountability to Whom? 
Testing and Social Justice




In response to Eugene Matusov’s article in this journal, Kritt addresses assumptions of the large- scale 
testing central to NCLB. Discussion of studies of urban kindergarten children that examine cognitive 
variability, including the assertion of ability, focuses on how this aff ects the student as a learner, as 
well as a teacher. In contrast, Matusov questions root assumptions of schooling, casting engagement 
in socially valued activities as an issue of human rights. Th is view is criticized as overly socialized. It is 
argued that surface- level functioning in a cultural context is not suffi  cient for full participation in a 
democracy.
The acrid rhetoric of educational politics certainly did not begin with No Child Left  Behind (NCLB). But the Bush administration’s provocation 
in introducing NCLB— citing “the soft  bigotry of low expecta-
tions” (U.S. Department of Education, 2003)— shift ed the dialogue 
about educational policy to cast those currently teaching, and 
especially their unions, as the primary enemy. Eugene Matusov 
(2011) takes the 2001 NCLB law at its face value, as the place to 
“start a discussion about an alternative, genuine, sociocultural 
vision of failure- free education” (p. 7). My engagement in that 
discussion is grounded in practices in urban schools, the gap 
between how children actually learn and what tests measure, and a 
radically diff erent interpretation of what tests reveal. Matusov and 
I agree that testing fails to capture thinking at its best, and it 
certainly should not be guiding instruction. And we generally 
share a sociocultural perspective. But I believe he presents an 
overly socialized viewpoint and so, we arrive at somewhat diff erent 
conclusions.
A brief history reveals some of the assumptions of large- scale 
testing. Th e original impetus for intelligence tests was educational 
placement of what, today, we oft en call special- ed students. Th e 
initial widespread use of intelligence tests was in the military 
during World War I, to determine who should be sent for special-
ized training, for example, in communications, leaving those not 
selected to do more routine and mundane tasks. In its long and 
ignoble history, so- called intelligence testing has also been used as 
an exclusionary tool to restrict immigration and eligibility to vote 
and as a justifi cation for proposed eugenics programs. In these 
cases, the negative implications of testing for democracy can be 
clearly seen. In educational practice, this is less evident but of no 
less serious concern.
Th e logic of testing has been to try to pass everyone through 
the same sieve. All individuals are expected to answer the same set 
of questions to demonstrate profi ciency at the same mental tasks. 
Th is is rife with assumptions of homogeneity, both in the popula-
tion and in the requirements of jobs and careers. In educational 
settings, intelligence testing and achievement testing have been 
used for sorting students into ability groups. Some students are 
identifi ed as having defi cits requiring placement in special- 
education classrooms. Others are tracked into classes with students 
of similar profi ciency levels in reading, math, or science.
Matusov questions two common statistical gambits used in 
reporting test results. One is normalization. A common standard is 
set for all children, but criteria for passing may be adjusted to 
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ensure that the range of performance fi ts a normal curve, with 
some students surpassing the mean and some students failing. 
Although the tails of the distribution contain relatively few 
individuals, the competitive assumptions are anathema to 
Matusov. In a similar vein, he objects to the goal of closing achieve-
ment gaps, because it implicitly accepts proportional success/
failure among social groups (e.g., Black- White, male- female, 
rich- poor); in other words, some within each group are expected to 
fall below the mean.
In several studies of urban kindergarten children (Kritt, 2004; 
Kritt, under review; Kritt & Shulman, in preparation), I examined 
cognitive variability in a more fi ne- grained manner. Using 
disaggregated testing data to look at individual performance (i.e., a 
collection of quantitative case studies) allowed for interrogation of 
the assumption that there is a relatively homogeneous mass of 
students with moderate abilities. A central debate regarding 
intelligence has focused on whether it is a general factor, so that 
we’d expect a person to have many talents in seemingly unrelated 
areas, or one that is domain specifi c. In the past, it was more 
common among psychologists to view a person as generally 
intelligent or not (Buckhalt, 2002; Carroll, 1991; Humphreys, 1979; 
Kranzler & Jensen, 1991). Th is idea has stuck among the general 
public, and may be at least partially due to a bias in social cogni-
tion, so if a person is good in one thing we simply assume he or she 
is good in many things. For example, Einstein was also, reportedly, 
a pretty good violinist, and comedian Steve Martin is also an actor, 
author, and musician. However, psychologists have increasingly 
recognized that many talents are domain specifi c (Gardner, 1983; 
Ceci, 1990). Th is may be due to either nature or nurture or, most 
likely, some combination of the two.
Th e fi ndings of the aforementioned studies, that there is a 
great deal of variability in an individual’s test performance across 
several areas (verbal, mathematical, perceptual- performance, 
memory), support an assertion by Gould (1981) that the statistical 
ideal of the average student, with abilities near the mean in all skill 
areas, is not representative of actual individuals. It is an important 
point because increasing numbers of students have diffi  culties in 
school that are subsequently labeled (e.g., as learning, attention, 
and behavior disorders). Now, all this diagnosis of children might 
be due to greatly improved diagnostic techniques. But Gould 
suggested in a later book (1996) that children never were uniform 
in their abilities. And Howard Gardner (1991) argued that schools 
have failed to adequately educate the vast majority of students.
Several implications for educational practice are rather 
obvious. Foremost, teachers should recognize a wide range of 
individual profi ciencies and goals and facilitate their development. 
Progressive educators encourage students learning while being 
involved in rich inquiry (e.g., projects), as well as emphasize 
authentic assessment that is part of meaningful classroom activi-
ties (e.g., Allen, 1998; Camp, 1990; Grigorenko & Sternberg, 1998; 
Kritt, 1993; Paris et al., 1992; Wiggins, 1989, 1998; Wolf, 1989).
It must be recognized that testing is an imposed and decon-
textualized task with no intrinsic meaning to the test taker, only 
instrumental value, as a means to some rather abstract academic- 
achievement goal. Some students may embrace this imposed goal 
as part of an achievement ideology (i.e., belief that doing well in 
school leads directly to doing well in life), but many, especially in 
urban populations, reject it (e.g., MacLeod, 1987/2008).
Rather than summative assessments that serve actuarial 
functions for politicians, assessment can be formative, so that it 
contributes to student learning and development. Vygotsky’s 
(1978) zone of proximal development (ZPD) is a prime example of 
assessment that could be useful to adults (parents and teachers) 
truly concerned with student learning (Kozulin, 2005; Rogoff , 
1990; Wertsch, 1985). Instead of stopping the assessment with a 
child’s answer to a question, the process continues to determine 
what the child can do with cuing and gentle assistance. Th e 
distance between what the child can do alone and what can be done 
with assistance is the ZPD. Educational eff orts (e.g., scaff olding) 
are targeted here.
Consideration of some classic issues in intelligence help us to 
further understand the way students are characterized and 
educated. One is whether intelligence is inherited or dependent on 
the environment. A famous family, the Huxleys, illustrates why it is 
a thorny issue. Th e grandfather was a biologist and an early 
defender of Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution. His grandsons 
included: Sir Julian Huxley, a noted biologist; Aldous, the author of 
Brave New World, Th e Doors of Perception, and other novels; and 
little brother Andrew, who received the Nobel Prize in physiology 
and medicine for his work on activity in the central nervous 
system. I think it is safe to say they had good genes, but also they 
undoubtedly benefi tted greatly from growing up in a stimulating 
family, being brought up in a way that encouraged curiosity and 
creativity. It is virtually impossible to separate genetic and environ-
mental infl uences, with notable exceptions being studies of 
identical twins separated at birth. Focusing primarily on genetic 
inheritance ratifi es not only privilege but also the futility of 
educating problem students. Th e faulty logic of arguments such as 
Hernnstein & Murray’s (1994), that the current distribution of 
performance on IQ tests is indicative of hereditary diff erences 
between races in intelligence, serves to justify existing economic 
hierarchies (Fischer, Janowski, Lucas, Swidler, & Voss, 1998; Jacoby 
& Glauberman, 1995). Furthermore, it suggests that patterns of 
placement in schools, employment, status, and power refl ect 
inherent diff erences in brains, rather than socially constructed and 
maintained divisions.
Another classic issue regarding intelligence is perhaps even 
more to the point. Th e assertion of ability refers to a hypothetical 
construct used to justify expectations. It is a useful concept if we 
want to talk about prediction of future performance in a variety of 
areas, ranging from educational achievement to employment and 
career to general well- being (cf. Sternberg, 1997). But that quickly 
becomes problematic (Riegel, 1976). As educators, we have a 
responsibility to provide optimal conditions for children to 
develop their talents. Yet we can observe and measure only what 
children have actually done. Th ese instances of performance may, 
of course, diff er according to contextual factors, testing conditions, 
and emotional factors. Even if a child is repeatedly tested under less 
than optimal conditions, and repeatedly performs poorly, it may be 
inaccurate to assert that the child lacks ability. Rather, we must 
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acknowledge that the child cannot perform under certain condi-
tions. And it is important to remember that the acontextual 
presentation of problems in a testing situation stands in stark 
contrast to the highly contexted character of activities that indi-
viduals perform in the real world and fi nd meaningful.
What does it mean to say someone has potential? Th e person 
has never done it, whatever “it” is, yet we state that he or she could 
do it. Th at is not exactly the same as saying we expect that child to 
do it. Parents have dreams for their children. Affl  uent parents can 
more easily do more than poor parents to give their children 
second and third chances. It is not just a curious coincidence that 
both test scores and academic performance have repeatedly been 
shown to correlate with parental income. From a social Darwinist 
perspective, this is readily accepted as confi rming the logic of the 
hierarchical structure of society. Th ose of a less severe bent are 
likely to seek an explanation in the eff ects of poverty.
If students from more affl  uent families are viewed in terms of 
their potential and other children viewed only in terms of their 
actual performance, they will be treated diff erently in educational 
settings. Teacher expectations can lead to favored treatment in the 
classroom that, in turn, contributes to student academic achieve-
ment (Alvidrez & Weinstein, 1999; Entwisle & Alexander, 1993). 
Diff erences between which students are most frequently called 
upon in class and which are not and among types of feedback given, 
as well as possible bias in appraisal of student work are mundane 
and oft en unintentional ways in which this occurs. Yet such 
microlevel dialogic processes contribute to macrolevel processes 
whereby schools are trading posts where economic and social 
privilege are transformed into superior academic performance 
(Bourdieu, 1977), which is used to justify superior life opportunities 
(cf. Anyon, 1981).
Th is same phenomenon can also be considered in a very 
diff erent way. Th e use of IQ test results to predict future develop-
ment is predicated upon implicit assumptions (e.g., emphasis on 
inheritance of intelligence, the g factor) about continuity of ability 
and the self. Th e eff ect of such beliefs on how individuals think of 
themselves as learners can infl uence students, parents, and teachers 
in ways that can accentuate the possibility of change or erect 
impediments to it.
We tend to view ourselves as others view us (Blumer, 1969; 
Mead, 1934/1962). Th is happens as a natural part of social interac-
tion. If someone treats us as if we are smart and capable, we tend to 
give an optimal performance. If we are treated as if we are dumb, we 
tend to perform at a lower level than we might otherwise (e.g., 
Steele, 1997). Th is is not a necessary reaction, and some very 
resilient individuals can defy expectations, but those are more the 
exception than the rule.
In everyday interactions in most of life’s spheres, the judgment 
of others is a subtler process than it is in school. Th e apotheosis of 
being judged is formal labeling in schools. Today it is usually not 
blatant, but both labeled individuals and peers recognize it 
nonetheless. Th e labeled individual tends to behave in ways that 
confi rm the label. Th at is not because the label is accurate but 
because a social dialectic has been set in motion. Adults let a 
student know they think the student can’t do something. Either out 
of defi ance or out of laziness, that student does not do much. Th at is 
taken as further evidence, and maybe teachers will give the student 
easier problems, which are not successfully completed once again. 
And so a transactional cycle is set in motion. Such insights inform 
several major theories of motivation.
Th ese theories have clear implications for understanding some 
extremes of student behavior in the classroom. Weiner (1979; 1986) 
focused on how people think about their individual successes and 
failures, whether they attribute their success to stable aspects of 
themselves, to stable aspects of the outside world, or to transient 
aspects either internal or external. Dweck (1986) identifi ed 
individuals who think their own abilities are relatively fi xed and 
others who view their performance as something that can change. 
Only the latter individuals consider the time and eff ort required to 
do homework to be worthwhile. Covington (1985) viewed it as the 
student’s attempt to protect a sense of self. If intelligence is an 
unchanging attribute, then students will use various tactics to avoid 
looking like they’re trying, so they will not appear, especially to 
peers, as incapable.
Reifi ed ideas about a person’s own intelligence are largely 
unwarranted but are frequently established early in an individual’s 
school career (e.g., Bandura, 1993; Entwisle & Alexander, 1993). 
Such static conceptions can be detrimental to future learning and 
development. Even in the absence of tracking, such designations 
aff ect individuals’ concept of themselves as thinkers and learners, 
as well as how others (parents, teachers, peers, coworkers) interact 
with them. Students who have more fl uid ideas about thinking and 
learning are more likely to try harder, explore, and be creative.
Behavior is malleable, performance is situation specifi c, and 
an individual’s functioning is best understood in its cultural context 
(and sometimes more than one, as with the embedded and 
interacting contexts of family, school, community, and macroeco-
nomic forces). Carrying these insights to their logical conclusions, 
Matusov (2011) states that it is desirable to create a world where 
there is equality of “access to socially valuable practices” (p. 4). 
Following critics of the logic of disability, such as McDermott and 
Varenne (McDermott, 1993; McDermott & Varenne, 1995; Varenne 
& McDermott, 1998), Matusov considers this “an issue of human 
rights rather than one of education” (p. 4). And this bold stance 
certainly changes the terms of the discussion. By shift ing the focus 
to “supportive infrastructures” and “policies and practices” and 
calling for “distinctive human networks” (cf. Hutchins, 1991; Lave & 
Wenger, 1991; Rogoff  & Lave, 1984; Salomon, 1993), Matusov 
establishes that “learning is only one of many means for access” (p. 
4). Citing aspects of the learning process that separate it from 
functional daily activity and the importance of communal rather 
than individual endeavor, he questions root assumptions of 
schooling as we commonly know them.
Th is focus on an ecology of support is laudable, but problem-
atic in several respects. Matusov’s idealistic assumption of wide-
spread support for failure- free education fl ies in the face of the very 
neoliberal values he critiques. In short, it seems apparent there is 
not enough to go around, and most parents want to give their own 
children an advantage. Recognizing sources of fundamental 
unfairness in capitalist society does not mitigate the deep infl uences 
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upon individual psychology (e.g., self- interest, competitiveness). 
Th ere is the world we live in and the world we’d like to live in.
In the process of making his point, Matusov discusses a 
number of ideas very familiar to progressive educators (e.g., 
Duckworth, 1987/2006; Langer, 1997; Wells, 1999), including the 
need for meaningful context and tasks as well as student involve-
ment in setting goals. He is also perhaps a bit politically incorrect, 
but truthful, when he states that “there will always be students who 
might not learn” (p. 6). Matusov sets himself apart when he states 
that “for these students, not to be behind is to develop other ways 
of access to socially and personally valuable practices and activi-
ties” (p. 6). For example, he suggests that reading is “one of many 
possible ways to access printed texts.” A glib counterexample is that 
I had to reread sections of his paper several times to grasp certain 
points. Hypothetically, I could have had access to this paper in 
aural form, but I am unsure if that would have allowed me to 
critically analyze the argument as well as I could using traditional 
literacy skills. Similarly, the use of some combination of images 
and enactment may have a more powerful impact but aff ord less 
opportunity for refl ection and assessment of the message. Indeed, 
because modes of communication made possible by information 
and communication technologies are so immediate, it is more 
diffi  cult to hold their messages at arm’s length and peruse them. 
Accordingly, some measures that might ensure education is failure 
free might also remove thought from the enterprise of engaging in 
socially valued activities.
Although ostensibly the same results might be achieved in 
some easier way, there is a diff erence between a surface- level 
performance and a deep and fl exible understanding. Reading a 
plot synopsis is not equivalent to reading great literature. Being 
able to estimate the total for items scanned in a checkout line is a 
useful skill. Knowing enough history to evaluate pronouncements 
about the war in Afghanistan adds valuable perspective to simply 
seeing a report on CNN. And having the critical skills to compare 
the speeches of politicians makes a person a better informed voter 
(i.e., “having all the input” is not suffi  cient).
At best, as in pursuit of a hobby, learning is largely intrinsi-
cally motivated and self- directed. But students must demonstrate 
competence in a range of domains in order to graduate from high 
school and pursue advanced training or education. Th ose who 
favor a standardized education, hoping it will lead to very similar 
outcomes, will inevitably be disappointed. For even with compa-
rable instruction and a level playing fi eld, such an education is 
likely to have diff ering eff ects. What students can make of their 
education is dependent upon the prior experiences and frame-
works they bring to it. A chess master viewing a chess match, an 
accomplished musician at the symphony, a chef eating a meal— all 
can fi nd signifi cance (and learn) in ways that the rest of us cannot. 
Even presented with identical situations, everyone does not benefi t 
in identical ways. Th ere can be multiple outcomes and there can be 
more than one pathway to a common outcome (cf. Werner, 
1926/1948).
Fully aware of all the constraints and injustices of the world, as 
an educator and as a teacher of teachers, I have a primary objective: 
I want young people to have options in life. Th is does not always 
require merely academic skills. Nor, as Matusov suggests, is it 
simply being able to do what everyone else can (cf. a Turing test for 
the illiterate or innumerate). It certainly does require a well- 
developed facility in questioning what is presented and thinking 
outside the box when necessary. Access and equality may be steps 
in this direction, but they are not suffi  cient preparation for full 
participation in a democracy.
Matusov’s analysis is ultimately based upon material dialec-
tics. In these times of emphasis on market forces in education (e.g., 
charter schools), this is a fresh and provocative perspective. Yet a 
more cognitive perspective upon cultural- historical activity theory 
(i.e., informed by Vygotsky’s writing on scientifi c concepts, 
1934/1987, as well as by Friere, 1970/1986) suggests that psychologi-
cal change is not automatic and contingent upon material condi-
tions. Rather, generalization, systematization, and understanding 
of abstract principles are necessary for people to become truly 
conscious, in the sense of being able to refl ect upon their own 
behavior and thought. In addition to preserving some of the best 
values of the educational tradition, this sort of awareness is 
necessary for the kind of real choices required for participation in a 
democracy. When we work toward creating the conditions for true 
and deep understanding that is not divorced from functioning 
within the cultural contexts most pertinent to our students, rather 
than focusing on improved test performance, we are truly being 
accountable as educators.
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